AbstractsLaw & Legal Studies
The Effect of Punishing 'Over-Contributors'� on Overall Welfare: Some Experimental Evidence
| Institution: | University of Minnesota |
|---|---|
| Department: | |
| Year: | 2015 |
| Keywords: | behavioral game theory; corporate governance; corporate social responsibility; experimental economics; game theory; public goods |
| Posted: | 02/05/2017 |
| Record ID: | 2067133 |
| Full text PDF: | http://hdl.handle.net/11299/174742 |
Abstract
A public goods environment was constructed to simulate a dilemma in which corporate managers choose between acts of corporate social responsibility and acts of profitability. An experiment was conducted to determine the effect of a penalty for contributing above a specific level. The penalty has significant effects, encouraging free riding and suppressing contributions at all levels, even though most contributions would not have triggered the penalty.
