|Institution:||Swedish National Defense College|
|Keywords:||The Cuban Missile Crisis; EXCOMM; United States; inter – and intra group conflicts; John F. Kennedy; Social Sciences; Political Science; Samhällsvetenskap; Statsvetenskap; Statsvetenskap med inriktning mot säkerhetspolitik; Statsvetenskap med inriktning mot säkerhetspolitik|
|Full text PDF:||http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-5309|
The Cuban Missile Crisis has been considered by political scientists and historians as one of the most critical point in U.S. – Soviet relations during the Cold War and probably the only case of the possibility of the nuclear exchange was on highest level. The Cuban Missile Crisis was considered to be a part of continued political game of the ideological struggle between the leaders of United States and Soviet Union. However, the fact of the existence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba created situation for U.S. government to decide what course of actions should be taken and not escalate a further confrontation, which could lead to a mutual nuclear exchange. The suggestions to such course of actions were coming from different members of the Executive Committee of the National Council or EXCOMM, which did make impact on U.S. president’s decision making in relation to Soviet installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba in October 1962. The focus of this study relied on outcome of the decisions taken on secret meetings within the Executive Committee of the National Security Council or EXCOMM (included U.S. president as member of this committee) during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. The results of this study show if inter – and intragroup conflicts within EXCOOM made such impact on decision making outcome.