|Keywords:||NATO; Secretary General; Policy Making; Jaap de Hoop Scheffer; Anders Fogh Rasmussen; Afghanistan; Libya; Leadership; Case study|
|Full text PDF:||http://hdl.handle.net/1887/32851|
This thesis provides one of the first analysis of the roles of the two most recent secretaries general of NATO (who finished their terms) in shaping the alliance policy on two major crisis affairs; Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on the mission in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Anders Fogh Rasmussen on the operation in Libya (Operation Unified Protector). Much has been written on NATO’s actions and decisions towards Afghanistan, but no specific research is available on de Hoop Scheffer’s leadership during the decisive period for NATO in Afghanistan, since command of the mission was turned over indefinitely to NATO on August 11, 2003. The same can be said for Rasmussen’s leadership during ISAF and NATO’s operation in Libya. The research question is: To what extent do NATO’s secretaries general shape alliance policy on crisis situations? This research question is answered through a case study research method on both de Hoop Scheffer’s and Rasmussen’s role in shaping NATO policy on two major crises situations during their term in office: Afghanistan and Libya. Both case studies consist of an analysis in three categories: systematic, organizational and personality factors.