AbstractsBusiness Management & Administration

A game theoretic approach is used for examining road pricing with multiple stakeholders. The incorporation of users’ acceptance is modelled through the notion of a veto player. This approach and its value as a policy tool is examined through a case study of the extended Randstad area, with one user class and two stakeholders with different objectives and different road pricing measures they can control. The results show that through cooperation both stakeholders can achieve better results than in the non-cooperative case. The allocation of the gains from the cooperative case is done with the help of Shapley value. When incorporating users’ acceptance, both these solution are accepted. However, the Shapley value assigns less value to the other 2 stakeholders than when the veto player did not exist. Game theory is deemed beneficial for policy-making for road pricing, although extra attention should be paid not to oversimplify the interactions between the stakeholders when translating them from real life to mathematic terms of game theory.