AbstractsBiology & Animal Science

We show that the embedding of a matrix game in a mechanistic population dynamical model can have important consequences for the evolution of how the game is played. In particular, we show that because of this embedding evolutionary branching and multiple evolutionary singular strategies can occur, which is not possible in the conventional theory of matrix games. We show that by means of the example of the hawk-dove game. Vain tiivistelmä. Opinnäytteiden arkistokappaleet ovat luettavissa Helsingin yliopiston kirjastossa. Hae HELKA-tietokannasta (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka/index.htm). Abstract only. The paper copy of the whole thesis is available for reading room use at the Helsinki University Library. Search HELKA online catalog (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka/index.htm). Endast avhandlingens sammandrag. Pappersexemplaret av hela avhandlingen finns för läsesalsbruk i Helsingfors universitets bibliotek. Sök i HELKA-databasen (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka/index.htm).