AbstractsPolitical Science

Although the regulations proscribe buying and selling of children and the Hague Convention (HCCH) states that “only costs and expenses, including reasonable professional fees of persons involved in the adoption, may be charged or paid” (HCCH, 1998: art. 32, 2), many critics of intercountry child adoption argue, that the “fees are so disproportionately large for the child’s home country that they encourage corruption and that along the way, the international adoption industry has become a market often driven by its customers.” (Graff, 2008: 60). Thus, despite the clear proscription of international laws on marketization and profiteering in ICA, there is evidence that, “international adoption has become an industry driven by money” (Graff, 2008:50). The nature of contemporary ICA, Kapstein argues, is reflective of “financial transactions among adoptive parents, birth mothers, and adoption agencies that [clearly] resemble payments” with “children, [like] most precious resources [commodities] being traded across borders” (Goodwin, 2006:61). This situation leaves much to be desired. First and foremost, one is unable to clearly determine whether international adoption agencies work to find homes for needy children or to find children for Western homes. Second and perhaps most important, given the establishment of international regulatory frameworks - the regimes1 in ICA, one wonders why market forces and profiteering incentives are still lingering in intercountry adoption.