|Keywords:||Turkey's EU accession; Cyprus|
|Full text PDF:||http://rudar.ruc.dk/handle/1800/12091|
This project treats the controversies surrounding Turkey’s possible EU membership and is explored according to the problem formulation “How does the Cyprus conflict influence Turkey’s prospect of becoming a member of the EU?” This will be examined according to the grand theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism as formulated by Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig, and the analytical framework of Two-Level Game as formulated by Robert D. Putnam. The project has its onset in Turkey’s accession process to the EU, starting with their bid for membership of the European Economic Community in 1959 leading up to the current status of negotiations. This negotiations have since 2006 been gridlocked after 18 chapters in the negotiations were blocked. We will present the argument that the main reason for this blockade is Turkey’s refusal to apply the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Agreement to the Republic of Cyprus. The reasons for the long accession process and the block of accession chapters will be sought to be explained by defining the state preferences regarding Turkey’s accession and the conflict of Cyprus, of the member states, who has been the most outspoken in regards to Turkey’s possible membership; The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. The defined state preferences will be utilized in order to answer to what extend the political game regarding the negotiations of Turkey’s accession, is primarily influenced by member state preferences or if a common EU preference is at play. The project concludes that the problematic surrounding the Cyprus conflict is not directly the cause of the prolonged accession of Turkey, but is rather used in a political game as an excuse for preventing Turkey becoming a member or to hold them check.